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ABSTRACT
The purpose of incremental cryptography is to allow the updating
of cryptographic forms of documents undergoing modifications,
more efficiently than if we had to recompute them from scratch.
This paper defines a framework for using securely a variant of the
incremental hash function designed by Bok-Min Goi et al. The
condition of use of their hash function is somehow impractical
since they assume that the blocks of the message are all distinct. In
this paper we show how we can discard this strong assumption so
as to construct the first practical incremental asymmetric signature
scheme that keeps efficient update operations. Finally, as the pro-
posed scheme has the defect to severely expand the signature size,
we propose a solution which drastically reduces this drawback.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Incremental cryptography, introduced by Bellare, Goldreich and
Goldwasser in [1, 2, 3], is used to maintain up-to-date at low com-
putational cost the outputs of cryptographic algorithms. If one has
the signature of the current version of a file, it is preferable to
avoid to recompute from scratch the signature algorithm applied
to the entire file whenever a modification is performed. Such a
low computational efficiency for update operations finds applica-
tion in various situations, for example when we want to maintain
constantly changing authenticated databases, editable documents
or even when we have to sign similar letters addressed to different
recipients. Nowadays, an area of application of greatest interest is
its use in cloud storage systems, trends to outsource personal data
make computational efficiency as well as space efficiency partic-
ularly important. Besides, an other interest of incremental cryp-
tographic schemes is their inherent parallelism which allow per-
formances to fit accordingly by using appropriate multi-processing
platforms.
Typical operations supported by incremental cryptography are
the replace, insert and delete operations. Authentication schemes
based on static hash tree can support only both replacement and
appending of a block in O(logn) where n is the number of blocks
of the message. Such schemes are used to authenticate fixed-size
memory [7]. Those based on a dynamic hash tree (or skip list) [2,
13, 12] can support additionally the insertion/deletion of a block
in O(log n) and can be used for the authentication of variable-sized
data, such as files. The running time of an insert operation can be
proportional with the amount of changes made in D to obtain D′ if
they are based on weakly related data structures such as pair-wise
chainings. This is the case for the PCIHF (for “Pair Chaining &
Modular Arithmetic Combining Incremental Hash Function”) hash
function defined in [10, 9] or for one of the MAC (Message Au-
thentication Code) algorithms defined in [2]. Note that random-
ized self-balanced data structures (such as the signatures based on
Oblivious Trees [13] or the authenticated dictionary [12] based on
non-deterministic skip lists) and pair-wise chaining ensure oblivi-
ousness at each modification on the signature (resp. tag), that is, the
updated signature (resp. tag) is indistinguishable from an original
one.
The problem of pair-wise chaining is that input blocks are weakly
related and by consequent the PCIHF hash function is subject to
trivial collisions [14, 16]. The use of the randomize-then-combine
paradigm in hash functions raises security issues due to the combin-
ing operator used. By simply performing a Gaussian elimination to
exhibit linear dependencies, Bellare et al [3] have proved that the
XOR combining operator is also subject to simple collisions when
used in un-keyed hash function. This one is discarded in the PCIHF
hash function in favour of a modular arithmetic operator to avoid
this second type of attack. Unfortunately, the use of such an opera-
tor remains delicate to recent sub-exponential attacks [15, 4].
Bok-Min Goi et al [10] have designed an efficient incremental
hash function based on the randomize-then-combine paradigm [3].
Unfortunately, their construction is based on the impractical as-
sumption that the blocks in the message to hash are all distinct.
Besides, due to recent attacks described in the Generalized Birth-
day Problem [15, 4], the security parameters of the PCIHF hash
function are no longer adapted. We show in this paper how one
can discard this strong assumption about the blocks of a message
to construct the first practical incremental asymmetric signature
scheme that keeps update operations within a linear runtime worst
case complexity. Since the first incremental signature scheme that
we describe produces signatures of size twice the length of the
messages, we propose a parametrizable version which reduces this
overhead with the counterpart of less time efficient updates. Fi-
nally, we show that we can reduce the security of our schemes to
the security of the underlying primitives involved, namely a set-
collision resistant hash function, a traditional signature scheme and
a simple combinatorial problem.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss
pair-wise chaining and give some useful definitions. In Section 3,
we introduce our incremental signature scheme for which an im-
provement is given in Section 4. Proofs of security are given in
Section 5 and efficiency of our solution is discussed in Section 6.
Finally we conclude in Section 7.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Cryptographic schemes take as input a document D which is di-
vided into a sequence of fixed-size blocks D1,D2, . . . ,Dn. Doc-
uments are then viewed as strings over an alphabet ∑ = {0,1}b
where b is the block-size in bits.
2.1 Operations on documents
We denote by M the space of modifications and define the
main modification operations M ∈ M allowed on a document as
follows: (i) M = (delete, i, j) deletes data from the block i to
j (included); (ii) M = (insert, i,σ) inserts σ between the ith and
(i+1)th block, where σ represents data of size a multiple of b; (iii)
M = (replace, i,σ) changes to σ the data starting from block i to
block (i+k−1) (included), where σ is of size kb.
The resulting document after a modification operation M is de-
noted D〈M〉. Other frequent modifications are the cut and paste
operations but, for the sake of simplicity, we do not deal with such
composite modifications here.
2.2 Hash functions based on pair-block chain-
ing
Pair-wise chaining1 roughly describes the following process:
given the n-block string D, each block (except the last one) is paired
up with the subsequent one, a pseudo-random function is then eval-
uated at the resulting point. We obtain in this way a sequence of
n− 1 values which characterizes a relation between the blocks of
the document. The following paragraph gives a detailed descrip-
tion.
The PCIHF hash function. This is the first really incremen-
tal hash function [10] implementing the randomize-then-combine
paradigm introduced by Bellare et al [3], as this one supports in-
sert and delete operations. A document D is divided into a se-
quence of blocks of size b. If the document length is not a multiple
of b-bits, a standard padding method is applied at its tail with a
bit “1” followed by the sufficient number of consecutive bits “0”
so that the last block is of size b. The final message is of the
form D = D1‖D2‖ . . .‖Dn with Di ∈ {0,1}b for i ∈ J1,nK. Besides,
a stronger assumption is made about the blocks of the document
which have to be all distinct, meaning that Di 6= D j for i, j ∈ J1,nK
and i 6= j. The hash value µ for PCIHF is calculated as following:
µ =
n−1
∑
i=1
R (Di‖Di+1) mod 2160
where the randomize operation R : {0,1}2b → {0,1}160 is a com-
pression function, or a pseudo-random function. Note that the
padding used is not secure, as shown with examples in [14]. Be-
sides, the authors of PCIHF advocate the use of a standard hash
function for the randomize operation and in this case the padding is
not required. This is because in standard hash functions a padding
is enforced whatever the input length is.
To ensure integrity of content a hash function must ensure first
and second pre-image resistance as well as collision resistance.
The security of a signature scheme based on the hash-then-sign
paradigm relies on the collision resistance property of the under-
lying hash function. A hash function is said to be collision resis-
tant if it is hard to find two messages that hash to the same output
value. The PCIHF hash function allows insert operation with a
running time proportional to the number of blocks to insert, and
replace/delete operations with constant cost. Besides, this one has
been proved to be collision resistant in the random oracle model
[10].
1The term pair-block chaining is also encountered.
The design problem. Let us denote (X ,Y ) a subsequence of blocks
starting with X and ending with Y , and [X ,Y ] a pair of consec-
utive blocks. We recall here the problems raised in [14] about
pair-wise chaining used in hash functions. The authors found mes-
sage patterns which lead to trivial collisions: (i) Palindromic mes-
sages of any block length, for instance the 3-block message B‖A‖B
which produces the same hash value than A‖B‖A; (ii) Certain non-
palindromic messages. As said explicitly in [14], "any two mes-
sages with the same block at both ends, and where all consecutively
paired blocks follow the same order, would cause collisions". The
given examples are the messages A‖B‖C‖B‖A and B‖C‖B‖A‖B
which produce the same hash value; (iii) In the case where the
XOR operator is used, messages with repetitive blocks could also
produce collisions. This is the case of the messages A‖B‖B‖B‖C
and A‖B‖C for which a pair number of pair-wise links [B,B] does
not change the hash value.
Now, concerning the second case above we can observe the
following two more general patterns leading to collisions: (i) If
a message contains at least three identical blocks, for instance
B‖X‖C‖X‖D‖X‖E, then we have the interesting sequence of pair-
wise links [X ,C], [C,X ], [X ,D] and [D,X ]. We see that we can
permute the subsequences ([X ,C], [C,X ]) and ([X ,D], [D,X ]) so
that the message B‖X‖D‖X‖C‖X‖E produces the same hash value;
(ii) If a message contains at least two pairs of identical blocks, for
instance the message B‖X‖C‖Y
︸ ︷︷ ︸
‖D‖X‖E‖Y
︸ ︷︷ ︸
‖F for which the two
subsequences (X ,X) and (Y,Y ) overlap, a permutation gives us the
message B‖X‖E‖Y‖D‖X‖C‖Y‖F which produces the same hash
value.
2.3 Incremental signature schemes
Definition 1. An incremental asymmetric signature scheme is
specified by a 4-tuple of algorithms Π = (G ,S ,I ,V ) in which:
• G , the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic polyno-
mial time algorithm that takes as input a security parameter
k and returns a key pair (sk, pk) where sk is the private key
and pk the public key.
• S , the signature algorithm, is a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm that takes as input sk and a document D ∈ ∑+ and
returns the signature s = Ssk(D) where s is a signature with
appendix, that is, s is of the form (D,s′) where D is the doc-
ument and s′ the appendix.
• I , the incremental update algorithm, is a probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm that takes as input a key sk, (a docu-
ment D), a modification operation M ∈M , and the signature
s (related to D) and returns the modified signature s′.
• V , the verification algorithm, is a deterministic polynomial
time algorithm that takes as input a public key pk and a sig-
nature s = Ssk(D) and returns 1 if the signature is valid, 0
otherwise.
Considering a modified document D′ = D〈M〉, the desired be-
haviours of an incremental signature scheme are the followings:
(i) It is required that Vpk(Isk(Ssk(D),M)) = 1. (ii) Optionally, an
incremental signature scheme could be oblivious (or perfectly pri-
vate) in the sense that the output of a signature Ssk(D′) is indistin-
guishable from the ouput of an incremental update Isk(Ssk(D),M).
This property is particularly useful if we want to hide the modifi-
cation history of a signed document, or even the fact that an update
operation has been performed.
2.4 Unforgeability
For incremental signature schemes, existential unforgeability mea-
sures the unability for an adversary to generate a new pair (D∗,S∗)
where: (i) D∗ is not a document that has been signed by the signing
oracle; (ii) D∗ is not a modified document obtained via the incre-
mental update oracle; (iii) S∗ is a signature on D∗. More precisely,
the notion of existential unforgeability under a chosen message at-
tack is defined using the following game between the adversary A
and the challenger:
1. The challenger runs algorithm G to obtain a public key pk
and a private key sk. The adversary A is given pk.
2. A chooses and requests signatures (adaptively) on at most qs
messages. Additionally, A chooses and requests at most qi
valid incremental updates (adaptively) on signatures issued
from the signing oracle (or from the updating oracle). The
term “valid“ means that the pair (D,S) on which the update
is requested satisfies Π.Vpk(D,S) = 1. The challenger re-
sponds to each query.
3. Eventually, A outputs a pair (D∗,S∗) where D∗ is not a doc-
ument signed by the signing oracle OSsk nor an updated doc-
ument whose the signature has been obtained from the in-
cremental update oracle OIsk . We say that A succeeds if
Π.Vpk(D∗,S∗) = 1.
Definition 2. Let Π = (G ,S ,I ,V ) be an incremental signature
scheme over modification space M , and let A be an adversary. Let
Advun fA,Π = Pr[sk ← G;S
∗ ← ASsk ,Isk : Vpk(S∗) = 1].
We say that Π is (t,qs,qi,ε)-secure in the sense of existential
unforgeability if, for any adversary A which runs in time t, making
qs queries to the signing OSK′ oracle and qi valid queries to the
update OIK′ oracle, Advun fA,Π is less than ε.
3. THE PROPOSED INCREMENTAL ASYM-
METRIC SIGNATURE SCHEME
We assume the use of a simpler version of the PCIHF hash func-
tion, denoted H, where input blocks of the random function are ex-
pressly unrelated. This incremental hash function has been proved
to be set-collision resistant [6] in the random oracle model un-
der the weighted knapsack assumption. From there we will use
it as a black-box primitive to design secure incremental signature
schemes. First we format the message correctly by enforcing the
padding in the following way: if the message length is not a mul-
tiple of 2b-bit, we padd the last block with a bit 1 followed by
the sufficient number of bits 0, otherwise we add a new block
whose content is 1{0}2b−1 . The final message is of the form M =
M1‖M2‖ . . .‖Mn−1 with Mi ∈ {0,1}2b for i ∈ J1,n−1K. The hash
value is computed such that µ = H(D) where H(.) is a function
taking a string of size a multiple of 2b-bit and returning a value in
{0,1}3200 . This last one is defined as follows:
H(M) =
n−1
∑
i=1
R (Mi) mod 23200
where the randomize function R : {0,1}2b →{0,1}3200 has an out-
put size of 3200 bits and the addition is performed modulo 23200.
Considering the problem of generating a second preimage, the out-
put size of R in the original PCIHF hash function is no longer
secure due to the efficient (subexponential) generalized birthday
attack [15, 4]. This force us to increase the output size of R by con-
sidering for instance 3200 bits, a choice of parameter which allows
us to guard against this attack by keeping an equivalent security of
112 bits.
Let us suppose a correctly padded (n− 1)-block message D =
D1‖D2‖ . . .‖Dn−1 with Di ∈ {0,1}b for i ∈ J1,n−1K. We assume
the use of a digital signature algorithm Ψ = (G,S,V ) in which: (i)
G takes as input a security parameter and returns a pair of keys
(sk, pk); (ii) S is a ppt signature algorithm taking as input the secret
key sk, a document D and returns a signature s; (iii) V is a dpt algo-
rithm taking as input the public key pk, a document D, a signature
s and returns 1 if the signature is valid, ⊥ otherwise.
Now we can describe the 4-tuple of algorithm IncSIG =
(G ,S ,I ,V ). The key generation of the incremental algorithm is
simply IncSIG.G = Ψ.G. The signature algorithm IncSIG.S tak-
ing as input the secret key sk and the document D is the following:
1. Pick uniformly at random n blocks of size b/2 denoted R1, R2,
..., Rn;
2. Compute the hash value
µ =
n−1
∑
i=1
R (Ri‖Ri+1‖Di) mod 23200;
3. Let l be the size of D, compute a signature s = Ψ.Ssk(µ‖l)
and return the incremental signature (R1,R2, . . . ,Rn,µ,s).
The verification algorithm IncSIG.V taking as input the public
key pk, the document D and the signature (R′1,R′2, . . . ,R′n,µ′,s′) is
the following:
1. Compute the hash value
µ =
n−1
∑
i=1
R (R′i‖R
′
i+1‖Di) mod 23200;
2. Let l be the size of D, run the verification b = Ψ.Vpk(s′,µ‖l)
and return b.
We describe hereafter the incremental algorithm IncSIG.I that
takes as input the secret key sk, the document D, the signature
(R1,R2, . . . ,Rn,µ,s) and an insert operation M = (insert, i,σ) that
changes D in D′ where σ is only one block (for the sake of simplic-
ity):
1. Draw a new random block of size b/2 denoted R;
2. Compute the hash value
µ′ = µ−R (Ri‖Ri+1‖Di))
+R (Ri‖R‖Di)
+R (R‖Ri+1‖σ) mod 23200;
3. Let l′ be the size of D′, compute a signature s′ =
Ψ.Ssk(µ′‖l′) and return the updated incremental signature
(R1,R2, . . . ,Ri,R,Ri+1, . . . ,Rn,µ′,s′).
We do not describe the other operations which can be deduced
from the previous one.
Remark. We could change the verification algorithm and reject
signatures with non distinct Ri’s. Checking that all the random
blocks are distinct would simplify the security analysis, but there
are several reasons for not doing this: (i) This verification is a costly
operation; (ii) The owner of the secret key is not considered as
an adversary in the standard definition of existential unforgeability.
The signing oracle is then implemented exactly as specified.
4. A SIMPLE IMPROVEMENT INCSIG*
By considering the same previous notations, let us also define
two fixed integers (k,d) ∈N∗2 such that b = kd with d ≥ 2. We de-
scribe an improvement of IncSIG in which we use a d-wise chain-
ing of random k-bit blocks. This parametrization will allow a user
to find a time/space efficiency trade-off without sacrifying security.
Now we describe the 4-tuple of algorithm IncSIG∗ =
(G ,S ,I ,V ). The key generation of the incremental algorithm is
simply IncSIG∗.G = Ψ.G. The signature algorithm IncSIG∗.V
taking as input the secret key sk and the document D is the fol-
lowing:
1. Pick uniformly at random n blocks of size bd denoted R1, R2,
..., Rn, Rn+1, ..., Rn+d−2;
2. Compute the hash value
µ =
n−1
∑
i=1
R (Ri‖Ri+1‖ . . .‖Ri+d−2‖Ri+d−1‖Di) mod 23200;
3. Let l be the size of D, compute a signature
s = Ψ.Ssk(µ‖l) and return the incremental signature
(R1,R2, . . . ,Rn+d−2,µ,s).
The verification algorithm IncSIG∗.V taking as input the public
key pk, the document D and the signature (R′1,R′2, . . . ,R′n+d−2,µ
′,s′)
is the following:
1. Compute the hash value
µ =
n−1
∑
i=1
R (R′i‖R
′
i+1‖ . . .‖R
′
i+d−2‖R
′
i+d−1‖Di) mod 2
3200;
2. Let l be the size of D, run the verification b = Ψ.Vpk(s′,µ‖l)
and return b.
We describe hereafter the incremental algorithm IncSIG∗.I that
takes as input the secret key sk, the document D, the signature
(R1,R2, . . . ,Rn+d−2,µ,s) and an insert operation M = (insert, i,σ)
that changes D in D′ where σ is only one block (for the sake of
simplicity):
1. Draw a new random block of size bd denoted R;
2. Compute the hash value
µ′ = µ−
i
∑
j=i−d+2
R (R j‖R j+1‖ . . .‖R j+d−1‖D j)
+R (Ri−d+2‖ . . .‖Ri‖R‖Di−d+2)
+R (Ri−d+3‖ . . .‖Ri‖R‖Ri+1‖Di−d+3)
+
i−1
∑
j=i−d+4
R (R j‖ . . .‖Ri‖R‖Ri+1‖ . . .‖R j+d−2‖D j)
+R (Ri‖R‖Ri+1‖ . . .‖Ri+d−2‖Di)
+R (R‖Ri+1‖ . . .‖Ri+d−1‖σ) mod 23200;
3. Let l′ be the size of D′, compute a signature s′ =
Ψ.Ssk(µ′‖l′) and return the updated incremental signature
(R1, . . . ,Ri,R,Ri+1, . . . ,Rn+d−2,µ′,s′).
Let us now describe this incremental algorithm in the case of a
replace operation M =(replace, i,σ) where σ is only one block (for
the sake of simplicity):
1. Draw a new random block of size bd denoted R;
2. Compute the hash value
µ′ = µ−R (Ri‖ . . .‖Ri+d−1‖Di)
+R (R‖Ri+1‖ . . .‖Ri+d−1‖σ) mod 23200;
3. Let l′ be the size of D′, compute a signature s′ =
Ψ.Ssk(µ′‖l′) and return the updated incremental signature
(R1, . . . ,Ri,R,Ri+1, . . . ,Rn+d−2,µ′,s′).
When performing a deletion operation, in order to maintain con-
sistency in the d-wise chain, the contribution of d hash values of
the non updated chain has to be deducted from µ while d− 1 new
values have to be added. This algorithm can be deduced from the
insertion one.
Remark. We could change the verification algorithm and reject
signatures with non distinct (d−1)-tuples of random blocks. Check-
ing that all these (d−1)-tuples are distinct would simplify the se-
curity analysis, but there are several reasons for not doing this: (i)
This verification is a costly operation; (ii) The signer is not con-
sidered as an adversary in the standard definition of existential un-
forgeability.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The property of obliviousness of the schemes IncSIG and IncSIG∗
is obvious and we focus only on the security analysis of unforge-
ability.
THEOREM 1. Let suppose that F is a (t,qi,qs,ε)-forger
against our incremental signature scheme IncSIG, then there ex-
ists a (t ′,qh,ε′)-collision finder C F against the underlying hash
function H and a (t ′′,qs +qi,ε′′)-forger F ′ against the underlying
signature scheme Ψ, where the quantities are related by
ε ≤
q2 −q
2b/2+1
+ ε′+ ε′′; t ≥ max{t ′− (qs +qi)tsign, t ′′}−qhtop,
where q = qs(nmax + 1)+ qi, qh = qsnmax + 3qi, and tsign and top
are, respectively, the maximum running times to perform a signa-
ture with Ψ and an operation in (F23200 ,+).
PROOF. For the sake of simplicity in the sketch of proof, we
only deal with insert operations of one block and suppose that a
document can have a maximum length of nmax blocks. Let us sup-
pose that there exists a (t,qi,qs,ε)-forger F against our incremen-
tal signature scheme IncSIG. By interacting adaptively with the
challenger in the game defined Section 2.4, the forger eventually
outputs a pair (D∗,S∗). The forger can win the game according to
both following possibilities:
• case 1: The value µ∗ contained in the successful forgery has
already been retrieved in a response to a query.
• case 2: The value µ∗ contained in the successful forgery has
never been encountered in the responses to the queries.
By assuming a forger against our incremental signature scheme
IncSIG, we show that the case 1 allows the construction of a colli-
sion finder C F for the hash function H and the case 2 a forger F ′
against the signature scheme Ψ. Indeed, we build a collision finder
C F for H and a forger F ′ for the underlying signature algorithm
in the following way:
• case 1: The collision finder C F uses F as a subroutine
and simulates an incremental signing oracle as follows: first
of all, C F executes Ψ.G to obtain a pair of keys (sk, pk)
and conveys pk to the forger F . Whenever F queries a
signature for a document, C F forms correctly the docu-
ment with an enforced padding to obtain a n-block document
D = D1‖D2‖ . . .‖Dn−1, then he (she) generates n random
blocks R1,R2, . . . ,Rn and computes
µ =
n−1
∑
i=1
R (Ri‖Ri+1‖Di) mod 23200
by resorting to the random oracle for the function R . Af-
ter that, he (she) computes a signature s on µ using the se-
cret key sk and responds to F with the incremental signature
S = (R1,R2, . . . ,Rn,µ,s). The updating oracle is simulated as
follows: whenever F queries an insertion of one block right
after index i in a signed document (D,R1,R2, . . . ,Rn,µ,s),
C F generates a new random block R and updates the value
of µ (random oracle accesses to R are needed) by first
removing the contribution of the pair-wise link [Ri,Ri+1]
and then adding the contributions of the two new links
[Ri,R] and [R,Ri+1]. Then he (she) computes a signature
s′ on the updated hash µ′ and sends the updated incre-
mental signature S′ = (R1,R2, . . . ,Ri,R,Ri+1, . . . ,Rn,µ′,s′)
to F . At the end, F comes with a new pair (D∗,S∗) where
S∗ = (R∗1, . . . ,R∗m,µ∗,s∗) and D∗ = D∗1‖ . . .‖D∗m−1. As we
supposed that s∗ was obtained from the signing oracle OΨ.Ssk ,
the set {R∗1‖R∗2‖D∗1, . . . ,R∗m−1‖R∗m‖D∗m−1} corresponds to a
set-collision for the hash function H if a certain condition
is fulfilled: the document corresponding to the forged sig-
nature is not simply a reordering of the blocks of a queried
document.
Let us denote by q the total number of random blocks used as
input to the random function such that q = qs(nmax +1)+qi .
We consider the list L of these q blocks reindexed for the
occasion so that L = (R′i)i=1...q. Let AD be the event that the
blocks of L are distinct, or in other words, R′i 6= R′j for all
i, j ∈ J1,qK with i 6= j.
When the event AD occurs the b-bit blocks of a signed mes-
sage can not be permuted without re-evaluating R to the new
appearing points, changing the final value of H. Let us de-
note simply by Scase1 the event of success of F in the current
case that we are describing. Then,
Pr(Scase1) = Pr(Scase1|AD)Pr(AD)+Pr(Scase1|AD)Pr(AD)
≤ Pr(AD)+Pr(Scase1|AD)
≤
q2 −q
2b/2+1
+AdvHscr
where AdvHscr is the advantage of C F for breaking the hash
function H in the sense of set-collision resistance.
• case 2: The forger F ′ uses F as a subroutine and simulates
its environnement as done by C F in the case 1 except for
the following differences: F ′ simulates the random oracle
for R by generating on the fly a table mapping input values
to random output strings and uses its own signing oracle to
obtain a signature on a hash value µ. Eventually, F comes
with a new pair (D∗,S∗) and we have supposed that s∗ has
not been obtained from the signing oracle, the output of F ′
is setted to (µ∗,s∗) which corresponds to a valid forgery.
Now we can focus on the security of IncSIG∗. A d-wise chain
staying a d-wise chain after an update, the obliviousness property
is obvious. Then we give only the interesting details of the proof
of unforgeability concerning the following theorem since this one
is very similar to the above.
THEOREM 2. Let suppose that F is a (t,qi,qs,ε)-forger
against our incremental signature scheme IncSIG∗, then there ex-
ists a (t ′,qh,ε′)-collision finder C F against the hash function H
and a (t ′′,qs + qi,ε′′)-forger F ′ against the underlying signature
scheme Ψ, where the quantities are related by
ε ≤
(qs +qi)(nmax +1)2
2(d−1)b/2+1
+ ε′+ ε′′;
t ≥ max{t ′− (qs +qi)tsign, t ′′}−qhtop,
where qh = qsnmax +(2d−1)qi, and tsign and top are, respectively,
the maximum running times to produce a signature with Ψ and to
perform an operation in (F23200 ,+).
PROOF. Keeping the previous notations, first notice
that in order for the adversary to permute two blocks
of a message, say Ri‖Ri+1‖ . . .‖Ri+d−2‖Ri+d−1‖Di and
R j‖R j+1‖ . . .‖R j+d−2‖R j+d−1‖D j with j > i, there are
two possibilities: (i) The message is of length two blocks.
In this case, R1‖ . . .‖R1+d−3‖R1+d−2 must be equal to
R2‖ . . .‖Ri+d−2‖Ri+d−1; (ii) The message has a length greater than
two blocks. In this case, having R j+1‖ . . .‖R j+d−2‖R j+d−1 equal
to Ri+1‖ . . .‖Ri+d−2‖Ri+d−1 is a prerequisite. Without this we can
not ensure the consistency with the (i+1)-th d-tuple in input to R .
Continuing, it remains to notice that a message of length n con-
tains n+1 (d−1)-tuples of random blocks. For each signature or
update query providing a signature for a document Di we consider
the list Li of the (d−1)-tuples involved in the produced signature.
Parametrization Bit-size
overhead
Number of
hash function
evaluations
Number of
additions in
Z/(23200Z)
(k,d) nk+(d−1)k n n−1
Table 1: Efficiency of IncSIG∗: Expansion size of a signature and com-
putational cost of the signing algorithm for a message of n b-bit blocks.
Insertion of one
block
Replacement of
one block
Deletion of one
block
(2d−1,d,d−1) (2,1,1) (2d−1,d−1,d)
Table 2: Efficiency of IncSIG∗: Computational cost of an update when
the parameter d is even, described in the form (nh,na,ns) where nh
is the number of hash evals, na and ns the number of additions and
substractions respectively in Z/23200Z.
Let AD′ be the event that the elements of Li are distinct for all
i ∈ J1,qs +qiK. It follows that:
Pr(AD′)≤ (qs +qi)(nmax +1)
2
2(d−1)b/2+1
.
6. EFFICIENCY
As we can see in Table 1, whatever the parametrization used
the cost to make a signature does not change. The operations in
Z/23200Z are much more expensive than the hash operations. There-
fore, a solution to decrease the number of arithmetic operations
could be to use larger blocks for the message at the counterpart of
less efficient updates. Obviously, such a choice is not interesting
in incremental cryptography, for which we would prefer to suffer
higher costs for the signature generation and perform efficient up-
dates.
When d increases exponentially (and k decreases exponentially),
the size of the signature decreases in the same way. For instance,
by choosing the triple (b,k,d) = (256,1,256) the overhead for the
signature size is only n+ 255 bits, that is to say, an overhead of
approximately 1256 -th the size of the message. On the other hand
we notice in Table 2 that this is accompanied by larger update costs,
showing that this is a question of compromise.
To effectively improve performances, the choice of the underly-
ing primitives is of great importance. Concerning the underlying
randomize function, we need a hash function capable of generating
outputs of size 3200 bits. The new standard SHA-3, Keccak [5],
allows the output size to be parametrized. Besides, it can be used
with a hash tree mode in order to increase the degree of parallelism.
However, if we can process the input message in parallel, it will be
interesting to do the same for the output. Nevertheless, Keccak
is based on the sponge construction and consequently the blocks
which appear in this variable-sized output can not be generated in
parallel, that is why we could prefer to use a solution based on
a counter mode or a GGM technique [11] to generate them. A
good choice could be the Skein hash function [8] which proposes a
hash tree mode and permits to generate the output string in parallel
as well. Concerning the underlying signature scheme Ψ, one can
choose any signature scheme based on the hash-then-sign paradigm
or a signature scheme providing message recovery. In this latter
case, the hash value µ could be removed from the incremental sig-
nature since it can be retreived during the verification process.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a method to construct an in-
cremental asymmetric signature scheme which ensures the perfect
privacy property. We have shown that we can discard the stronger
assumption done about the blocks of the message and still use se-
curely and in a practical way an incremental hash function based
on pair-wise chaining. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
incremental asymmetric signature whose the update algorithm has
a linear time worst case complexity.
Besides, we have shown how we can reduce the size of the sig-
nature, but at the expense of greater number of hash operations and
additions/substractions. Such a signature scheme is interesting for
many applications in which we have to authenticate a lot of docu-
ments that continously undergo modifications, this is the case of the
virus protections, the authentication of files systems and databases.
More generally, this is particularly welcome for ensuring efficiently
a secure handling of files in cloud storage systems.
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